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When, after a thorough examination by the trial judge as to the
facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct of the jury, he finds
that justice would be better served if the jury were discharged, the gen-
eral rule is that such a decision will not be disturbed on appeal, and on
subsequent retrial, double jeopardy will not attach.37
In view of the constitutional and common law prohibitions against
double jeopardy, and consistent with the basic theory that such mistrial
is to be used only in cases of manifest necessity, it is submitted that the
decision in the instant case is sound.
38
GEORGE M. BRITT
Civil Procedure-Consent Judgments and Settlements-Right of
Liability Insurer to Bind Insured
The North Carolina motorist who reads his liability policy carefully
will probably notice that it contains a clause substantially as follows:
The Company shall (a) defend any suit against the insured al-
leging such injury, sickness, disease, or destruction and seeking
damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false,
or fraudulent; But the Company may make such investigation,
negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems ex-
pedient.1 (Italics added.)
The usual policy also includes an express condition precedent to the
insurer's obligation to indemnify the insured which requires him to for-
ward immediately to the insurer any process, demand, notice, or pleading
served on him because of an accident in which the insured was involved.
2
to their fitness and competence to serve as jurors when court convened on Friday
morning.") [Italics added.]
" See notes 18-24 supra. In the majority of cases in which a mistrial has been
sustained over defendant's objection, the trial judge has personally examined the
jurors to determine the necessity for a discharge of the jury.
" State v. Crocker, 239 N. C. 446, 453, 80 S. E. 2d 243 (1954). "Our holding
here is that the facts and circumstances set forth in the findings of fact are not of
such compelling nature as to justify a further relaxation of a rule of such import-
ance in safeguarding the life and liberty of a citizen against repeated prosecutions
for the same offense. The preservation of the salutary principle underlying the plea
of former jeopardy in capital cases is of far greater importance than the service by
this defendant of the prison term imposed by the judgment . . . upon her conviction
for manslaughter."
'Because of this wording the standard indemnity policy is more than a mere
contract of indemnity against actual loss in the sense of money paid. It is a con-
tract of insurance against liability for damages, and the insurer adopts the liability
of the insured, within policy coverage. State ex rel. Boney v. Central Mutual Ins.
Co. of Chicago, 213 N. C. 470, 196 S. E. 837 (1938).
If the plaintiff and the defendant are both insured by the same company, the
insureds must engage their own attorneys, and the policies become mere indemnity
policies. O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P. 2d 483 (1946).
'Hendrix v. Employer's Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 31 (E. D. S. C.
1952) ; Martin v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 258 S. W. 2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953). See Stephens v. Childers, 236 N. C. 348, 72 S. E. 2d 849 (1952).
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These provisions seem reasonable enough, but their combined legal
effect can result in harsh injustice to the insured. For example, let us
suppose that an insured motorist was involved in an automobile collision
caused by the negligence of the other party. The insured's damage was
considerable, while the other motorist's injuries to person and property
were slight. Before the insured had engaged an attorney to prosecute
his claim against the other motorist, he was made defendant in an action
by the other party. In order to avail himself of the benefits of his policy,
he forwarded the process immediately to his insurer. Pursuant to its
contract right to control the defense8 the insurer employed attorneys to
defend the action against the insured. These attorneys settled with the
plaintiff and consented to an entry of judgment against the insured which
the insurer satisfied. May the insured, who had no knowledge of these
proceedings, now sue the negligent party?
Alabama, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Ohio have held that the
insured is barred by this consent judgment when he undertakes to sue
the other motorist,4 and New Jersey has held that, even when no con-
3 U. S. A. C. Transport, Inc. v. Corley, 202 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Traders &
General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F. 2d 621 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Attle-
boro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573
(1st Cir. 1917) ; Abrams v. Factory Mutual Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N. E. 2d 82
(1937); Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931)
Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269, 91 S. E. 94d
(1917).
The right to control carries with it several correlative duties. The insurer is
liable to the insured when in bad faith it refuses to defend a claim within policy
coverage. Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F. 2d 621
(10th Cir. 1942). It is also liable for the negligence of the attorneys engaged to
defend the action. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident, & Plate
Glass Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573 (1st Cir. 1917). The insurer is liable to the insured
if its attorneys negligently allow a judgment in excess of policy coverage to be
entered against the insured. Abrams v. Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 298
Mass. 141, 10 N. E. 2d 82 (1937). It has been said that the insurer owes a duty
to the insured to assert every proper and available defense in his behalf. Jewtraw
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 280 App. Div. 150, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 727,
730 (3d Dep't 1952). See State Automobile Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F. 2d 730 (4th
Cir. 1939), cert. denied 308 U. S. 591 (1939).
However, in Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269,
91 S. E. 946 (1917) where the injured party recovered against the insured an
amount in excess of the value of the policy, it was held that the insurer was not
liable for refusing to settle with the injured party at a figure within policy cover-
age, such settlement being within the discretion of the insurer, who would be liable
only for fraud, negligence, or failure to act in good faith.
'A.B.C. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So. 2d 511 (1946).
This case is a good example of how the rule sometimes works injustice. While
the insured's action against the owner of the other vehicle was pending in the
Alabama trial court, the defendant rushed over to Georgia and served agents of
the insured with process. The insured's agents called in the insurer, which de-
fended the action in the Georgia trial court. However, defendant obtained verdict
and judgment against the insured. Then the defendant pleaded this Georgia judg-
men in bar of insured's suit in Alabama. The plea was allowed, and the insured
lost its day in court. Its officers had no knowledge of the Georgia proceedings.
The principal factor working against the insured was that the Alabama court could
not set aside a Georgia court's judgment unless the judgment was void on its face.
Brown, ., dissented vigorously.
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sent judgment was entered, a settlement in and of itself is nevertheless
a bar to any subsequent action initiated by the insured, arising out of
the same transaction.5 However, both as to settlements and consent
judgments, the majority rule is contra.6 Thus, most jurisdictions which
have considered the question hold that the attorney hired by the insurer
to defend the action against the insured has no authority, express or
implied, to impair any substantive rights of the insured.7
Some of the courts among the majority rely on the limited nature of
the authority of the insurer's attorney,8 while others have held that the
insurer's attorney cannot in any way be considered an agent of the in-
Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931); Keller v.
Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951) (settlement coupled with "dis-
missal with prejudice") ; Ross v. Stricker, 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N. E. 2d 18 (1950)
(verdict rendered against insured, judgment entered on the verdict; insured not
allowed to set aside judgment satisfied by the insurer without his consent).
"Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N. J. 17, 80 A. 2d 196 (1951), rehearing denied, May 14,
1951. See Note, 51 CoL. L. REv. 1062 (1951).
6 Settlement by insurer's attorneys no bar: U. S. A. C. Transport Inc. v. Corley,
202 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 248 S. W. 2d 362
(1952) ; Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 540, 196 S. E.
279 (1938) ; Last v. Brains, 238 Ill. App. 82 (1925) ; Emery v. Litchard, 137 Misc.
885, 245 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1930) ; Jetton v. Polk, 17 Tenn. App. 395, 68
S. W. 2d 127 (1933) ; Owen v. Dixon, 162 Va. 601, 175 S. E. 41 (1934) ; Pater-
noster v. Swick, 43 Luz. L. Rx. 119 (Pa., June 5, 1953).
The New Jersey lower courts have twice held that an unauthorized settlement
by the insurer's attorneys is no bar to an action by the insured, distinguishing
Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N. J. 17, 80 A. 2d 196 (1951). Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N. J.
Super. 95, 86 A. 2d 695 (App. Div. 1952) ; DeCarlucci v. Brasley, 16 N. J. Super.
48, 83 A. 2d 823 (L. 1951).
Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App. 18, 194 S. W. 751 (1917) held that the
settlement by the insurer's attorneys did not bar the insured's claim. Keller v.
Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951) did not expressly overrule this
decision, but involved the question of failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim
before the "dismissal with prejudice."
See also American Trust & Banking Co. v. Parsons, 21 Tenn. App. 202, 108
S. W. 2d 187 (1937) (insured never served with process).
Where the insurer's attorneys settled with claimant, and insurer became in-
solvent before payment, it has been held that the settlement was not binding on the
insured, when the claimant undertook to collect from the insured. Countryman v.
Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N. Y. Supp. 744 (4th Dep't 1934) ; Haluka v. Baker,
66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N. E. 2d 68 (1941). Also, when the insurer's attorneys
withdrew from the case because of the insurer's sudden insolvency and what was
in effect a judgment by default was entered against insured, this default judgment
was vacated. Fessler v. Weiss, 348 111. App. 21, 107 N. E. 2d 795 (1952).
'Even in the jurisdictions in the minority on this point there is no problem
where the policy is a combined collision-liability policy, for the insured then has
no substantive rights to be impaired. Upon full payment to the insured of damages
suffered by him, the insurer is subrogated, and as the real party in interest may
maintain suit against the other motorist. Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N. C. 157,
72 S. E. 2d 231 (1952) ; Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 686 (1929).
Of course, the insured may still lose his cause of action for any damage to person
or property not covered by the policy or for which the insurer has not made him
whole.
' Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 248 S. W. 2d 362 (1952) ; Fessler v. Weiss,
348 IIl. App. 21, 107 N. E. 2d 795 (1952); Burnham v. Williams, 198 Mo. App.
18, 194 S. W. 751 (1917) ; Countryman v. Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 744 (4th Dep't 1934) ; Jetton v. Polk, 17 Tenn. App. 395, 68 S. W. 2d 127
(1933) ; Paternoster v. Swick, 43 Luz L. REG. 119 (Pa., June 5, 1953).
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sured.9 The courts adopting the limited agency view (i.e., holding that
an attorney cannot without express authority bind his client by a settle-
ment or entry of a consent judgment) are supported by the weight of
authority.10 On the other hand, the courts rejecting the agency argu-
ment are also supported by authority, for it is a cardinal principle of
agency that the principal is allowed some measure of control over his
agent," and under the terms of the policy it would seem clear that the
insured has no control over the conduct of the litigation. 12 Furthermore,
the insurance company is only incidentally acting on behalf of the in-
'U. S. A. C. Transport Inc. v. Corley, 202 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Foremost
Dairies, Inc. v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 540, 196 S. E. 279 (1938) ; Last
v. Brains, 238 Ill. App. 82 (1925); Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N. J. Super. 95, 86
A. 2d 695 (App. Div. 1952); DeCarlucci v. Brasley, 16 N. J. Super. 48, 83 A. 2d
823 (L. 1951) ; Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N. E. 2d 68 (1941). But
cf. Stephens v. Childers, 236 N. C. 348, 72 S. E. 2d 849 (1952) which holds that
the insurer's attorney is the agent of the insured, and that the attorney's negligence
is imputable to insured, for the purposes of vacation of judgment on the grounds
of excusable neglect. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-220 (1953).
In Emery v. Litchard, 137 Misc. 885, 245 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1930) it
was said that a settlement was not an admission of liability, since the question of
liability of the parties was for the jury to decide.
"0 Crawford v. Tucker, 258 Ala. 658, 64 So. 2d 411 (1952) ; Fresno City High
School Dist. v. Dillon, 34 Cal. App. 2d 636, 94 P. 2d 86 (1939); DeLong v.
Owsley's Executrix, 308 Ky. 128, 213 S. W. 2d 806 (1948) ; Sudekum v. Fasnachts'
Estate, 236 Mo. App. 455, 157 S. W. 2d 264 (1942); Town of Bath v. Norman,
226 N. C. 502, 39 S. E. 2d 363 (1940) ; Smith v. Land and Mineral Co., 217 N. C.
346, 8 S. E. 2d 225 (1940) ; Morgan v. Hood, 211 N. C. 91, 189 S. E. 115 (1937);
Early v. Burns, 142 S. W. 2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
However, it is often said that the attorney is presumed to have authority to
bind his client, and the party seeking to avoid the settlement, compromise, judgment
or stipulation has the burden of overcoming this presumption. City of Medford v.
Corbett, 302 Mass. 573, 20 N. E. 2d 402 (1939) ; Renken v. Sidebotham, 227 S. W.
2d 99 (Mo. App. 1950) ; Ledford v. Ledford, 229 N. C. 373, 49 S. E. 2d 794 (1948) ;
Keen V. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8 S. E. 2d 209 (1940) ; Wadden v. Sanger, 250
S. W. 2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
Some courts hold that an attorney has authority to bind his client by a settle-
ment or entry of a consent judgment, implied from the nature of his employment.
Ferrara v. Genduso, 214 Ind. 99, 14 N. E. 2d 580 (1938) ; Bielby v. Allender, 330
Mich. 12, 46 N. W. 2d 445 (1951) ; Rader v. Campbell, 134 W. Va. 485, 61 S. E.
2d 228 (1949). See Harrington v. Buchanan, 222 N. C. 698, 24 S. E. 2d 534 (1943).
"Isaacson v. Boswell, 18 N. J. Super. 95, 86 A. 2d 695 (App. Div. 1952);
Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N. E. 2d 68 (1941); RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY §§ 1(1) ; 14, comment b (1933). See also RESTATEM ENT AGENCY §§2(3),
385 (1933).
It should be noted here that for the purposes of privileged communications be-
tween attorney and client, the insured is considered the client of the insurer's
attorney. N. Y. Casualty Co. v. Superior Court In and For the County of San
Francisco, 30 Cal. App. 2d 130, 85 P. 2d 965 (1938) ; State v. Krich, 123 N. J. L.
519, 9 A. 2d 803 (Supt. Ct. 1939) ; Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699,
249 N. Y. Supp. 631 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Westminster Airways, Ltd. v. Kuwait Oil
Co. (1951) 1 K. B. 134. But the policy giving rise to the privilege is obviously
not incompatible with a holding that an insurer contracting to defend an action
against the insured may not prejudice his substantive rights; it does not follow
that because of the attachment of the attorney-client relationship for purposes of the
privilege, the insured stands to lose his cause of action because of the attorney's
default.
" See note 3 supra.
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sured, but is furthering its own interests13 in fulfilling its express con-
tract obligations to the insured.
14
North Carolina has never decided the question of the authority of
the insurer's attorney to bind the insured by a settlement or consent
judgment which prejudices the insured's substantive rights. In two
cases the question could have been decided, but the counsel for the in-
sured collaterally attacked the consent judgments which had been entered
against the insured, and the question was therefore not properly raised.15
Since there has been no definite holding by the North Carolina Court
that the insurer's attorneys are authorized to bargain away the substan-
tive rights of the insured, the way seems clear for a successful attack
against the judgment by means of a motion in the cause.16  Forasmuch
" Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co.,
240 Fed. 573 (1st Cir. 1917) ; Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 52 N. E. 2d 968
(1944) ; Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931).
' Goldstein v. Bernstein, 315 Mass. 329, 52 N. E. 2d 559 (1943) ; Abrams v.
Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N. E. 2d 82 (1937).
" LaLonde v. Hubbard, 202 N. C. 771, 164 S. E. 359 (1932) ; Stone v. Carolina
Coach Co., 238 N. C. 662, 78 S. E. 2d 605 (1953). In the first cited case, counsel
for the insured took a voluntary nonsuit when the trial judge refused to allow the
plaintiff to introduce evidence that the former judgment had been rendered without
his consent, and then appealed to the Supreme Court. Ih the second cited case
counsel for the insured filed a reply to defendant's amended answer -which set up
the consent judgment as a bar to plaintiff's cause of action, the trial judge over-
ruled defendant's demurrer to the reply, but the Supreme Court reversed, on the
ground that a consent judgment cannot be collaterally attacked.
It is well settled in this state that a consent judgment entered without authority
cannot be collaterally impeached. Coker v. Coker, 224 N. C. 450, 31 S. E. 2d 364
(1944) ; Gibson v. Gordon, 213 N. C. 666, 197 S. E. 135 (1938) ; Cason v. Shute,
211 N. C. 195, 189 S. E. 494 (1937) ; Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E.
25 (1920). The proper procedure for setting aside consent judgments is by a
motion in the cause. Hall v. Shippers Express, Inc. 234 N. C. 38, 65 S. E. 2d 333
(1951) ; King v. King, 225 N. C. 639, 35 S. E. 2d 893 (1945) ; Gibson v. Gordon,
213 N. C. 666, 197 S. E. 135 (1938) ; Boucher v. Union Trust Co., 211 N. C. 377,
190 S. E. 226 (1937) ; Dietz v. Bolch, 209 N. C. 202, 183 S. E. 384 (1936) ; Bizzell
v. Auto Tire & Equipment Co., 182 N. C. 98, 108 S. E. 439 (1921). But see State
ex rel. Jones v. Griggs, 223 N. C. 279, 25 S. E. 2d 862 (1943) ; Morris v. Patterson,
180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E. 25 (1920). See also N. C. GiuN. STAT. § 1-207 (1953).
If the consent judgment is attacked in the same county by independent action,
the court may treat the action as a motion in the cause, rather than to dismiss.
Coker v. Coker, 224 N. C. 450, 31 S. E. 2d 364 (1944).
A judgment which is irregular is also open to attack only by a motion in the
cause. Collins v. State Highway Commission, 237 N. C. 277, 74 S. E. 2d 709
(1953) ;MACINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
§ 653 (1929). As regards vacating a judgment because of surprise or excusable
neglect under authority of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-220 (1953) see Note, 31 N. C. L.
Rv. 324 (1953), and Moore v. Deal, 239 N. C. 224, 79 S. E. 2d 507 (1954).
When the record shows the judgment to be void, a motion in the cause is not
necessary to vacate it. Williams v. Trammel, 230 N. C. 575, 55 S. E. 2d 81 (1949) ;
Powell v. Turpin, 224 N. C. 67, 29 S. E. 2d 26 (1944) (collateral attack allowed) ;
Clark v. Carolina Homes, Inc., 189 N. C. 703, 128 S. E. 20 (1925) (may be quashed
ex ilero vwtu). And see Ledford v. Ledford, 229 N. C. 373, 376, 49 S. E. 2d 794,
796 (1948), and Town of Bath v. Norman, 226 N. C. 502, 505, 39 S. E. 2d 363, 364
(1946) for dicta that a consent judgment is void if such consent does not exist at
the time the court gives the judgment contract its sanction.
" The present Chief Justice Barnhill stated in Stone v. Carolina Coach Co.,
238 N. C. 662, 665, 78 S. E. 2d 605, 607 (1953) that: "If plaintiff wishes to proceed
1954]
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as a consent judgment is nothing more than a contract between the par-
ties spread upon the records and given the court's sanction, 17 it would
seem that consent by both parties is necessary to make this contract
binding,18 and it is well recognized in this state that insufficient authority
in an attorney to consent to judgment is sufficient reason for setting it
aside.19 Furthermore, North Carolina follows the weight of authority
in holding that an attorney by reason of his office has no implied author-
ity to compromise away his client's cause of action,20 or consent to entry
of judgment against him.
21
Yet arguments can be made that the insured should not be allowed
to escape the full effect of the settlement or consent judgment. First,
although by the terms of the policy the insured has no control over the
insurer's attorneys and cannot demand that he be notified of the develop-
ments in the case, in some situations he will have sufficient notice. If
the claimant's complaint is verified, then verification of the answer is
mandatory in North Carolina,2 2 and since the verification is an affidavit
of the party it is to be made by the party himself.23  If the insured is
further in this cause, he must first have the Parker judgment vacated by independ-
ent action or motion in the cause, as he may be advised. It is not proper for us
at this time to express an opinion as to which is the appropriate remedy."
" King v. King, 225 N. C. 639, 35 S. E. 2d 893 (1945) ; State ex rel. Jones v.
Griggs, 223 N. C. 279, 25 S. E. 2d 862 (1943) ; Keen v. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8
S. E. 2d 209 (1940) ; Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E. 25 (1920);
Gardiner v. May, 172 N. C. 192, 89 S. E. 955 (1916).
18 Pack v. Newman, 232 N. C. 397, 61 S. E. 2d 90 (1950) ; Ledford v. Ledford,
229 N. C. 373, 49 S. E. 2d 794 (1948) ; Gibson v. Gordon, 213 N. C. 666, 197 S. E.
135 (1938) ; Dietz v. Bolch, 209 N. C. 202, 183 S. E. 384 (1936) ; Bank of Glade
Spring v. McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E. 222 (1912).
"8Town of Bath v. Norman, 226 N. C. 502, 39 S. E. 2d 363 (1946) ; Morgan
v. Hood, 211 N. C. 91, 189 S. E. 115 (1937); Dietz v. Bolch, 209 N. C. 202, 183
S. E. 384 (1936) ; Peoples Bank of Burnsville v. Penland, 206 N. C. 323, 173 S. E.
345 (1934) ; Bizzell v. Auto Tire & Equipment Co., 182 N. C. 98, 108 S. E. 439
(1921) ; Chavis v. Brown, 174 N. C. 122, 93 S. E. 471 (1917) ; Gardiner v. May,
172 N. C. 192, 89 S. E. 955 (1916) ; Hoell v. White, 169 N. C. 640, 86 S. E. 569
(1915) ; Bank of Glade Spring v. McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E. 222 (1912).
Where ,both parties actually consent to the judgment, it is necessary to obtain
the consent of both parties before setting it aside. Ledford v. Ledford, 229 N. C.
373, 49 S. E. 2d 794 (1948) ; King v. King, 225 N. C. 639, 35 S. E. 2d 893 (1945) ;
Keen v. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8 S. E. 2d 209 (1940) ; Boucher v. Union Trust
Co., 211 N. C. 377, 190 S. E. 226 (1937).
There is some language in the reports to the effect that a consent judgment
obtained by fraud and mistake, being nothing more than a contract, may be attacked
in an independent action. Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E. 25 (1920) ;
Gardiner v. May, 172 N. C. 192, 89 S. E. 955 (1916) ; Bank of Glade Spring v.
McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E. 222 (1912).
" Town of Bath v. Norman, 226 N. C. 502, 39 S. E. 2d 363 (1946) ; Bizzell v.
Auto Tire & Equipment Co., 182 N. C. 98, 108 S. E. 439 (1921) ; Chavis v. Brown,
174 N. C. 122, 93 S. E. 471 (1917).
"1 Morgan v. Hood, 211 N. C. 91, 189 S. E. 115 (1937) ; Bank of Glade Spring
v. McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E. 222 (1912).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-144 (1953). But in Stone v. Carolina Coach Co., 238
N. C. 662, 78 S. E. 2d 605 (1953) the complaint in the former action was verified,
but the answer filed by the insurer's attorneys was not. Transcript of Record,
pp. 12, 15.
2
' McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES § 367
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called upon to verify the answer, or any other pleadings, he would have
sufficient notice of the progress of the action to be represented by his
own attorney, who would be charged with prevention of any compro-
mise prejudicial to the insured's interests.24 Furthermore, most policies
of liability insurance contain as an express condition a "cooperation
clause" 25 providing that the insured must cooperate in the defense, else
the insurer is relieved of liability.26  If the cause is tried doubtless the
insured will cooperate and his presence would give him sufficient op-
portunity to object to any compromises detrimental to his interests.
Second, one court which has consistently refused relief to the insured
in this situation has said that the insured cannot accept on the one hand
the benefit of the defense of the action and .the satisfaction of the claim
against him, and on the other hand contest the insurer's actions which
work to his detriment.
2 7
Third, an attorney engaged contemporaneously by the insured to
assert his claim against the other party within the framework of the
action against the insured should certainly keep in contact with the
insurer's attorneys to prevent action prejudicial to his client's interests,
for such default might be chargeable to the client.
28
(1929). When the action or defense is founded upon a written instrument for the
payment of money and the instrument is in the possession of an agent or attorney,
or if all the material allegations of the pleadings to be verified are within the per-
sonal knowledge of the agent or attorney, such agent or attorney may make the
affidavit. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-146 (1953). These two exceptions seem to be
inapplicable in an action for damages arising out of a motor vehicle collision.
" In La Londe v. Hubbard, 202 N. C. 771, 164 S. E. 359 (1932), the insured
defendant had engaged his own attorney. However, the attorney knew nothing of
the agreement to enter the consent judgment and therefore he did not sign it. The
court held that a consent judgment was not open to attack just because it was not
signed by all of the insured's attorneys of record.
If insured's own attorney arranges a dismissal of the action against his client,
upon agreement that a settlement will be made out of court, the wording of the
stipulation may constitute a retraxit, which would operate to bar insured's claim
much as would a consent judgment. Steele v. Beaty, 215 N. C. 680, 2 S. E. 2d
854 (1939). This opinion also includes an excellent discussion of types of dis-
missals, etc., which will and which will not operate as res judicata. Id., at 682-685,
2 S. E. 2d at 855-857 (1939).
n These clauses typically state that the insured is to cooperate with the insurer,
and upon request of the insurer is to attend hearings and trials, and assist in effect-
ing settlements, giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses, and so forth.
0 Shafer v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 279, 289 N. Y. Supp. 577
(4th Dep't 1936) ; MacClure v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, Switz-
erland, 229 N. C. 305, 49 S. E. 2d 742 (1948) ; Hoffman v. Labutzke, 233 Wis 365,
289 N. W. 652 (1940).
Yet, it is clear that this clause is for the convenience of the insurer, and when
the parties reach a compromise agreement early in the case, the clause never comes
into play, and the insured has no notice of the developments in the case.
" Hayes v. Gessner, 315 Mass. 366, 52 N. E. 2d 968 (1944). See Keller v.
Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951).
" Among other things, the attorney must know that a counterclaim is in effect
compulsory in such actions, and that if a counterclaim is not pleaded his client will
be forever barred from recovery. McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic Stages,
Inc., 95 F. Supp. 437 (M. D. N. C. 1951).
The principle of res judicata was established to prevent needless litigation, and
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Fourth, in addition to being an express grant of authority to settle,
might not the words "but the Company may make such investigation,
negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient"
be construed as granting authority2" to consent to entry of judgment
against the insured? Massachusetts has so held. 0
In 1932 the Massachusetts legislature, recognizing the unfairness to
the insured resulting from this decision binding him,3 ' enacted a statute
to the effect that a judgment entered by agreement, secured by bond or
liability policy, would not operate as a bar to any subsequent action by
the insured or bonded defendant unless such agreement was signed by
the defendant in person.3 2  Should the need become apparent, the North
Carolina General Assembly might enact a comparable measure.
The General Assembly in 1953 adopied the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act which is in effect in most states and which provides,
inter alia, that the insurer's liability is to become absolute whenever
bars not only all questions actually litigated, but those which could have been
raised as well. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 186 (1946). This principle bars
the parties and their privies as to all questions litigated in one-transaction automo-
bile accident cases. Stone v. Carolina Coach Co., 238 N. C. 662, 78 S. E. 2d 605
(1953) (insured party barred from proceeding against employer of driver who had
judgment against insured) ; Pinnix v. Griffin, 221 N. C. 348, 20 S. E. 2d 366 (1942)
(injured party barred from suing employer where he had already obtained a judg-
ment, although inadequate, against employee); Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint
Stock Land Bank, 215 N. C. 501, 2 S. E. 2d 570 (1939) (plaintiff's agent-driver
was adjudged negligent in action against him by bank's driver-employee; judgment
against plaintiff's agent-driver estops plaintiff from proceeding against bank).
There are many cases dealing with the doctrine of res judicata as it applies to
co-defendants who are also joint tort-feasors. Where A obtains verdict and judg-
ment, or settlement, or consent judgment against B, and B is later sued by C, A
may successfully plead res judicata when B joins A as co-defendant for contri-
bution under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953). Stansel v. McIntyre, 237 N. C.
148, 74 S. E. 2d 345 (1953) ; Snyder v. Kenan Oil Co., 235 N. C. 119, 68 S. E. 2d
805 (1951); Herring v. Queen City Coach Co., 234 N. C. 51, 65 S. E. 2d 505
(1951) ; Tarkington v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 230 N. C. 354, 53 S. E.
2d 269 (1949).
Where judgment is entered against co-defendant joint tort-feasors, and is satis-
fied by 'both, the plea of res judicata is available in subsequent actions between them.
Lumberton Coach Co. v. Stone, 235 N. C. 619, 70 S. E. 2d 673 (1952). But where
A sues B and B brings cross action against C as joint tort-feasor, but A does not
amend his pleadings to state a cause of action against C, the question of C's
liability to A is not in issue, and A may sue C in a subsequent action. Powell v.
Ingram, 231 N. C. 427, 57 S. E. 2d 315 (1950). As to the necessity for adversary
pleadings between all the parties, see Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N. W. 2d
446 (1952).
" In Morgan v. Hood, 211 N. C. 91, 189 S. E. 115 (1937) it was held that
authority to compromise a case, and to consent to a judgment founded on such
compromise, cannot be conferred upon an attorney by an agent who was authorized
by his principal to employ an attorney to defend the action. Accord, Attleboro
Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573
(1st Cir. 1917). But cf. A. B. C. Truck Lines Inc. v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25
So. 2d 511 (1946) ; Petition of Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of N. Y., 273 App. Div.
993, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 674 (1st Dep't 1948).
"°Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931) (entry
of consent judgment was an appropriate method of settlement).
" Note 30 supra.
"
2 MASS. ANN. LAws c. 231, § 140(A) (1933).
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injury occurs, and that no violation of the policy shall defeat or void it.33
This statutory provision would seem to be an unequivocal expression of
public policy for the protection of injured parties3 4 within policy cov-
erage by making certain that the insurance company cannot avoid pay-
ment because of a breach by the insured of some of the policy condi-
tions.35  This provision, however, does not relieve the insured of any
of the pressure which forces him to forward summons and other process
immediately to the insurer. For, he would still be liable to the insurer
for failure to fulfill his contract obligations if he allowed an unreasonable
time to elapse in order to engage a personal attorney before forwarding
the process.
36
R. G. HALL, JR.
Income Tax-Deductibility of Attorney's Fees for Tax Purposes
The deductibility of legal fees for income tax purposes is an important
factor to be considered by lawyers and laymen alike. If a client is in the
fifty per cent income tax bracket, the Federal Government will, in effect,
pay one half of any fee deducted by the client. This may well be an
influencing factor in determining the overall financial consequences of
employing legal counsel.
In order to be deductible, the fee must fall into the category of busi-
ness or non-business expenses as set out in the Internal Revenue Code.
If the fee covers both deductible and non-deductible items, it should be
allocated between the two, and failure to so allocate may result in the
disallowance of the entire amount.1 The provision for business expenses
requires that an expense, to be deductible, must be both ordinary and
necessary, and incurred in carrying on a trade or business.2 The pro-
33 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279(f) (1953).
"' Courts of other states have construed this provision as an absolute protection
of injured third parties. Century Indemnity Co. v. Simon, 77 F. Supp. 221 (D. C.
N. J. 1948); Farm Bureau Automobile Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N. H. 196, 84 A. 2d
823 (1951); Atlantic Casualty Co. v. Bingham, 10 N. J. 460, 92 A. 2d 1 (1952),
affirming 18 N. J. Super. 170, 86 A. 2d 792 (App. Div. 1952); Stonborough v.
Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of New York, 292 N. Y. 154, 54 N. E. 2d 342 (1944),
affirming 266 App. Div. 838, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 512 (1st Dep't 1944), affirming 180
Misc. 339, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
"' Such as breach of the "cooperation clause," or failure to forward immediately
all summons and process received.
O Where the insurer is absolutely liable to make the injured party whole, be-
cause of a statute such as N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279(f) (1953), a cause of action
accrues against the insured when he fails to fulfill the policy conditions to the preju-
dice of the insurer. Illinois Casualty Co. v. Krol, 324 Ill. App. 478, 58 N. E. 2d
473 (1944); Service Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Aronofsky, 308 Mass. 249, 31
N. E. 2d 837 (1941) ; American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Big Four Taxi Co., 111
W. Va. 462, 163 S. E. 40 (1932).
'Jordan v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A. 423 (1928).
'INT. REv. CoDE § 2 3(a) (1) (A) provides for the deduction of "all ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business. .. ."
NOTES AND COMMENT
